Sunday, August 26, 2007


We accomodate Mr. André Glucksmann, whom I do not have need to present. Writer, representative of intellectuals in these hearings, it wrote especially much on the war. We will ask him for his point of view of on the reforms of the professionnalisation of our armies, the suppression of the military service, the non-military national service.

Mr. GLUCKSMANN. - Thank you to listen to me. I specify immediately that I am not the
representative of the intellectuals, because they are not let represent, by definition.
Moreover, I am not a normal intellectual because I entered to CNRS. At the time I was sponsored by Raymond Aron whom I did not know, and who said to me: "we will be two in the university to have read Clausewitz". We were to be well three or four, it exaggerated a little.
Always it is admittedly that the war and the soldier are a subject taken with "to some extent
grains hair" by the intellectuals. The only council that my small experiment enables me to
propose to you is that to take your time because it is a subject which is not "boat",
it is badly attended. The war is an intellectually unpleasant object. A very simple example.
Take a French who would have been born in 1900, it would be thus 95 years old today.
Let us suppose it still able to reason, to go in library, to be driven - it is a a little
literary assumption -. It would have lived ten years war, also a few weeks or a few months of
strike - take the Popular Front or the last events of December 95- and, I hope for it, a pleasant,
passion life and nights of love. Let us make the total and send it in library.
On its passion businesses it has whole rooms, scientists who deal of the sexual life, passions,
the self-control, of the universities devoted to the psychology of the feelings, or the love life,
the human reports/ratios, etc. For its days and its months of strike, it has also strong
universities or libraries, and masses of books on the class struggle, the social conflicts,
the social distribution, in short all sociology. On the war, it has of course memories,
autobiographies, because many intellectuals or writers made the war. But the serious treaties,
the studies, the theories constitute a shelf of library. It is inversely proportional to devoted
time: ten years of war for a ray, a few months of strike for whole libraries of sociology, and
as many nights of passion with masses of writings. That indicates that there is a kind of taboo
on an adventure unfortunately essential at the XXème century. With 21st it will be always also
essential and taboo? Thus take your time to think of it. However there are two positive aspects:
the war lends to objective reflexions and not partisanes. Take the example of the Clausewitz
strategist. It was admired by the German staff, Karl Marx and Mao Tsé Toung.
It was also vilified by part of the French and Americans, it found defenders among them.
I will name for example Jaurès and Raymond Aron. One can reflect on the war in an objective way
not partisane and agree, that one is of left or right-hand side, French or German, for a very
simple reason: thinking the war, one is obliged to think the point of view of the adversary,
would be this only to envisage it. This bilateralism, this intelligence on the two sides are not
a moral virtue, but a strategic need. That it is seldom practised it is true. I will take the
example of Gaulle, it was read more in Germany than in France when it published his first
writings. It has itself in France taken its party of our divisions partisanes and tried to put
forward its point of view at Leon Blum, without succeeding too there, at Reynaud, while
succeeding there better, but without extreme effectiveness considering the character of the
character, and finally it made its decisions all alone. There is an objectivity which deserves
to be retained, and in France there is a popular feeling of interest for the war.
As much treaties are thin, as much it there has true interest popular, which perhaps makes the
originality France, in this direction not that French like war, but that they think that it is a
prism able to make them intelligent, including with respect to businesses not inevitably warlike.
I will quote Laclos for the "dangerous Connections", but on Sartre had more influence Michel
Zevaco, and the character of Pardaillan in had more than joined together Hume, Husserl and Marx.
It is essential to think that it is a difficult subject, but which lends to objectivity and which
is popular. I read what the press reported of the declarations of our head of staff.
I think that the method is good, but that it deserves to be thorough. It consists in posing that
it is starting from the reflexion on the new strategic situation which one can decide of what
should be the army and the conscription in the future. The method is completely good, it arrives
late, but it has the merit to exist. For this good departure, it is necessary to try to go
further, if not one is victim of journalistic événementielles truths. However you have to decide
what will occur for thirty or forty years. Therefore, is needed that the new situation is not
volatile, transitory, purely événementielle, is not limited to journalistic considerations.
Today, a weekly magazine titrates on new fanaticisms. New of agreement, fanaticisms of agreement,
but tomorrow it will have another title. Can one decide future of the army and thus of the safety
of the nation opposite simply événementielles considerations? The fall of the Wall is a
significant event, which already lent to extremely divergent interpretations. I point out that
one announced the end of the combat, the history, etc. The director of "Spiegel" published a
leading article on January 1, 1990, saying "Alexandre the Large one opened the doors of the war
in Europe, Gorbatchev closed again. From now on we are in another era "One year after the
photograph and the cover of" Spiegel it was "Inferno", allusion to the war of the Gulf with gas
masks, the apocalypse. Attention with événementiel, it is necessary to try to locate heavy
tendencies, and the question is: does there exist something of basically different in the manner
of making the war, thus allowing forecasts on twenty, thirty or forty years? I answer yes,
because there are constants in the European experiment of the war, and two among are not worth
any more. I will name them. Clausewitz said: "the war was initially a war between princes then
between States, then, in the light of the French revolution, between nations" Since, that was a
war between blocks, the first world one, the second, and the cold war was the world divided into
two blocks. This war of princes, States, nations and blocks brings to two constants:
a permanent tendency to increasingly massive mobilization, and a symmetry in the combat.
The increasingly massive mobilization is that of the men - think of the French revolution and to
Napoleon but the First World War made an incalculable number of deaths. Of Gaulle said:
"there never was in all the French history as many deaths as during the First World War"
Thus increasingly massive mobilization of the men and the resources, the economies, according to
an extremely known topic, but a constant. The second is the capacity to found duels on the
battle field, the wars were wars between armies, camps, therefore duels. These are the two
features which "jump" and which appear absent since the fall of the Wall It is a heavy tendency.
The fall of the Wall expresses from now on the precedence of wars which are neither of the
planetary mobilizations nor of the symmetrical duels, but this presence of the wars existed front,
it had simply been masked by the cold war. It existed in its margins, in all Third World.
The fall of the Wall, the end of the policy of the blocks simply brought marginal types of wars
because they occurred in the Third World to the heart from Europe, for example in Yugoslavia.
They are heavy tendencies because they express a planetary phenomenon. The first is the release
of warlike energies, to some extent the emancipation of the warrior. Traditional Europe defined
the State as being the place of the monopoly of violence, and consequently the warrior was
subjected to this authority, the State being defined in his sovereignty like monopolizing
violence. One could go up to Jean Bodin to define this monopoly of violence by the State.
However it is precisely what disappears. The blocks monopolized violence centrally.
Saddam Hussein would not have had its autonomy as long as the Soviet empire existed in its
splendour. The blocks demolishing itself, the authority disperses and gives place to warlike
initiatives one cannot more autonomous, but in addition the States themselves, put besides those
traditional, of Western Europe and those with their image, American and Japanese, do not
monopolize in the whole of planet violence. One attends the emancipation of the warrior
everywhere, in particular of the young warrior, in Somalia, in Liberia... The heroes of MADE,
of the Islamic Face of Hello, are young people, monks certainly but who smoke of kif and drink
on the occasion: I had recent testimonys of people who were between their hands.
That applies to the whole of planet, for reasons which one can easily locate: the "kalachnikov"
with range of everyone, the planetary communication, and winding-up of the traditional companies,
with in more unemployment, the social disorganization, the hunger, etc. There is thus a planetary
fish pond of young warriors who discovered without much evil that with various labels, that they
are chocolate éclairs, ethniques, national or ideological, they could get weapons, and with them
women, residences, uniforms and also of the stations. In all Third World, when you have a weapon
and an organization you have richnesses of which the others are private. That is seen with the
size, when one has a belt one is alive, in the contrary case... Therefore, there is emergence of
the young warrior released everywhere. I tried more precisely to treat that in the last number
of the review "national Defense", by calling these young characters of the new totalitarian
warriors. But it is a heavy tendency of the century. Of Gaulle located in the emancipation of
the German staff something of nietzschéen, concerning the will for power. Suddenly the soldier
releases himself from his obedience compared to a State and to the population. That appeared in
the German staff during the war then in the irregular forces of the Baltic, of the Rhineland,
etc. Hitler made its service of order of it. This disease was spread in the whole of the
century and planet: Mad max in Somalia, 13 years Bast young people drawing everywhere, human
bombs of any kind, etc. These conflicts are not symmetrical any more. If they are not
monopolized by the State, they do not oppose armies to armies, soldiers with soldiers.
With regard to the last conflict in the heart of Europe, in Yugoslavia, you do not have names of
battles at the head, but only of cities. That means that Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, etc,
they are men-at-arms everywhere which massacres the civil ones without weapon.
And this report/ratio is not episodical, événementiel, it is a general rule of the conflict of
today. Take Tchétchénie, there are primarily Russian men-at-arms in particular, which massacre
wrongly and through, if possible not soldiers, but rather the villagers whom they have within
reach, while holding to ransom them on the occasion. This style of combat at all traditional,
but is not planetarily diffused. We passed from the civil war to that against the civil ones.
That gives obviously obvious terrorist episodes. MADE in Algeria finds its authority by
égorgeant high-school girls, singers, journalists, and by depositing bombs a little everywhere,
in particular in the most attended streets. It is not attacked especially, only, specifically,
like the terrorists of formerly, with men in uniform. It is not a question of a civil war,
but against the civil ones, and this phenomenon is world. Therefore, the conflicts are
détotalisent, disperse, proliferate geographically because they escape the monopoly control from
the State, and are exerted primarily against the civil ones. It is a very heavy tendency,
statistics prove it. You have to face something who is like the movement of the century.
80 % of died of the war of 14-18 were in uniform. During the war from 40 to 45, moment when the
war against the civil ones becomes systematic in Guernica to start -, 50 % of deaths are civil
and 50 % military. And since, statistical recoveries by the UNICEF in 1992, all the wars made
several million died and related to 80 % of civil. Thus, the proportion completely changed.
All the conflicts which exist since 1945 make 80 % of deaths civil. The humane organizations
make their publicity by showing a photograph of children and while saying: "the new target of
the war, it is the child". It is a heavy tendency proven by the statistics, I tried to show you
the reasons of them. These two constants, that of the official monopoly - the prince, the State,
the nation or the block and that of the disciplined organization, disappear. We are opposite a
new phenomenon of war, and, consequently, it is right to provide that the army deserves
transformations. In that, I think that the Douin General is right. There is something basically
again which deserves forecasts over thirty years. One concludes the need from it from military
projections, or more generally from interventions on the spot of combat. They can be pressures
economic, diplomatic, of interventions of style information. Unfortunately, that was neglected
much in the Yugoslav conflict, but one could have informed the Serb population of what occurred.
It is a shame which UNO rather provided the boycott of the foreign newspapers. I made meetings
in Belgrade in full war, treating Milosevic of assassin. It was possible, there was an opposition.
It said to me: "you are completely insane, we cannot read your newspapers any more because you
issued an embargo, whereas we need information, ours being completely nationalized and the
population taken in hand by official television". All that deserves to be thought.
We will be sometimes, seldom I hope for it, constrained to interventions called projections,
even military, they go in the direction of the total situation of planet.
They have a moral need and a sedentary need, and they are not opposite. The moral need, it is
the 20 hour old Newspaper. Deputies and senators speak much about the censure of the scenes of
violence to television, because the children and the teenagers undergo them and are likely to
draw some from bad lessons. But in the westerns, the films catastrophe, etc, they in spite of
are very seen by them like scenes of unreality. Violence that they see they it irréalisent.
Since the cinema exists, there is a concern of the parents concerning films, but the generations
follow one another and did not become completely wild yet, although they were flooded films and
maintaining sequences televisual of which I guaranteed not extreme richness.
On the other hand, the 20 hours information, it is not cinema, it is the truth, reality in any
case. What does one read, which one hears, that one sees? That the crime pays, that one can
kill his parents, that one can massacre civil populations in short, that one can in July massacre
10.000 people in the heart of Europe with Srebrenica and December to be made film by televisions
skiing when one is called the Mladic General, that the crime pays. And this permanent sequence
at 20 hours on "the crime pays, it does not have there a punishment, one can during 70 years
devastate a country", all the televiewers noted it. They learned that Communism was worse than
than the anticommunists in its practical achievements said some to Tchernobyl and around the sea
of Aral, etc, and realized that there was strictly no sanction compared to the devastations
produced into 70 or 40 years. Thus the crime pays, it does not have a punishment, it there is a
permanent sequence. If it is estimated that the westerns, the erotic films, the films
catastrophe are likely to demoralize youth, much more demoralizing are the 20 hours information.

What thinks a young person of the suburbs if it realizes that finally, when one cuts the throat
of women in Algeria and that one signs agreements well thinking in Rome, one is recognized by the
unit or most of the French political community like valid interlocutor, that for MADE?
There is a kind of demoralization of the population which one does not hold enough account.
The massacre of the small people, for example that of Tchétchènes with despite everything the
financing of G7, which gives appropriations to the Russians, poses problem.
It is not extremely moralisant nor educational. Moments ago when it will be necessary to
intervene. A bad conscience is spread among televiewers who make same calculations as no matter
whom, namely that it was enough that Europe and America intervene, not send a few tens of
thousands of soldiers in Yugoslavia so that the massacre ceases, so that the good is established,
from where a feeling of responsibility, culpability at best, or demoralization at the least
structured. I think that the effect of the current events is quite worse than that of all
possible and conceivable films, also bad are. One would not have to prohibit the current events,
but the reality to which they testify. It is to better intervene on the ground to modify
information. One will be normally obliged there from time to time. One cannot undergo at
20 hours, in our dining room, a massacre, a génocide style of that of Rwanda.
There were no cameras, it was the first time, but imagine the repetition of this kind of events
and its effect on the public morality. I do not oppose the moral one and the sedentary one.
I was in Yugoslavia as of the first glares, before even the bosniaque question, there were in
Croatia the bombardment of a city, Raguse, second Venice, which I visited under the cannonades,
I went in Osijek, beside Vukovar, one month after the massacre, in December 91.
Frankly it was obvious at the time it was necessary to intervene, that one could stop the events,
that if one had forced with silence, in a way or of another, the few batteries which cannonaded
Dubrovnik, the virtue of the example would not have paid and the Serb ones would not have been
allowed to draw like rabbits the women and the children in Sarajevo. Thus there is possibility
of intervening and required sedentary. Why? Because there is a vicious virtue of the example.
When a small fire is not stopped, it grows, quite simply because the young potentials warlike
totalitarian are believed very allowed. One did not stop in Croatia, one had Bosnia, one spent
time to stop Bosnia, one had Tchétchénie. It is quite obvious that the Soviet staff would have
hesitated twice before intervening in Tchétchénie if the position in Yugoslavia of the
democracies had been more consequent and more rigorous. Therefore, there are a danger of example,
one of training too. The Russian staff in Tchétchénie realizes that its army is not extreme
effectiveness, believing to solve the problem in two hours, then in two days, then in two weeks.
Now, for fifteen months, that has gone badly. The Russian population does not appreciate, is
rather against. There is a danger because the staff learns that it can do about anything and
that Europe will not say anything, and that its means are not with the height of its ambitions.
If you think that the Russian staff has the second nuclear arsenal in the world, knowing that its
conventional possibilities are rather bad, it is likely to pass to nuclear gesticulations rather
easily, if one leaves him the free hands of course. The more so as it was not educated like
Stalin, Brejnev, etc, by a long training of what is dissuasion. I also point out that it is a
true sedentary danger to us, the French, and the whole of Western Europe, and that the nuclear
danger existed. The Russian and American historians met on the crisis of Cuba and said that it
was serious. A man as estimable as Sakharov, Nobel Prize, had had positions before extremely
aventurists. I quote it to say to you that it is not a question simply of young barbarians or
teenagers in anger. At the time, Sakharov was in favour to put on the Soviet ships of the atomic
guns able to sweep New York. The navy refused, saying "that does not form part of our traditions".
It is an extremely dangerous situation if one lets assemble the dangers, including conventional,
if one leaves the free hands to the various staffs. To be completely precise, you cannot
establish plans concerning French national defense without holding account owing to the fact that
after all the Wall fell, the curtain rose. But nobody knows if it is not likely to be positioned
back, perhaps more in the east, if a militarist capacity takes the things in hand in Moscow,
no one cannot exclude it. You do not know what will occur to China. Perhaps will succeed in
they giving each other an economic base of free exchange and an extremely authoritative mode,
still communisant or crypto-communisant at the top, which would avoid the Yugoslav bursting to
them, but which would represent also a danger. Imagine very strong China with a liberal economy
and an authoritative mode, that would involve situations known in Europe. The empire of
Guillaume was at liberal economic base and with somewhat authoritative mode, it cost us rather
expensive. Hitler had not socialized absolutely the economic base, etc. Japan either.
Therefore, there are very large possibilities of conflicts, dangers. A country as Algeria does
not have nuclear weapons of course, but if you imagine an Algerian instability, you can imagine
behind great powers who transmit certain secrecies of weapons, the Russians, the Chinese, etc.
Think of all that, and you have situations which deserve suitable tools. I think that the
military idea of projection is serious, which makes well vis-a-vis a certain number of dangers,
but which does not take into account the whole of the problems. When projection is thought, one
thinks half of the new strategic situation. It is necessary to also try to think opposite,
to put at the place potential adversaries, those which would threaten our safety and our values
from here twenty to thirty years. However we have a problem not simply projection, but of
forecast of the against-projection of the adversary. This problem is never taken into account
in the strategic explanations given today. What the against-projection of the adversary?
We have certain examples of them. We are democracies, it is possible to exert pressures on them.
During the last month there was the election in South Korea, the militarist and aggressive push
in North Korea; the election in Taiwan and of the aggressive demonstrations of China; elections
in Algeria, before DID it which was against A so desired to show its power, its impact, etc.
As it was blocked in Algeria, it made attacks in the Parisian subway, which were recipient of the
election campaign. They took place at 5 hours and to 8 heures.Tous the Algerians look at the
most objective information which is, which is not those of their television, but those of French
television. In all the daily newspapers of Algiers, there are the programs of the first, the
second and the third chains. MADE showed its presence, proved its effectiveness by making
attacks in Paris, it is there that it carried out its election campaign. We are at the same
time of the democratic countries dependent on the public opinion, and the countries which
practise freedom of movement of information. Both make that there is against-projection of the
dictatorships and the terrorists. In 1982 or 1983, right before the elections in France, of the
hostages in Lebanon had been particularly neat, and the videotapes had left to influence our
elections and to modify the foreign politics of France. There thus is a permanent pressure.
Terrorism is not at all a small method of the groupuscules, it is a method of war of the
dictatorships against the democracies, i.e. also a heavy, major tendency of the XXème century.
Take the exodus in France, the rout of June 40. There is Stukas, the radios, distort them
information, the panic of the population. This idea that one can panic a democratic population
and act on it endangers national safety, the independence of the country. A very simple example:
the situation in Israel currently. It is enough to three human bombs in the buses of Jerusalem
to modify the result of the elections obviously. Therefore, of the democracies are such as three
candidates with the suicide, three fanatics are able to change these results, therefore the
government. Who decides in this case? They are the three committed suicide and not the public
opinion. It is not valid only for Israel, although its situation is particularly critical.
Think of the success of an attack tried in the United States, that on Twin Towers of New York,
it would have hustled the public opinion and could, in certain circumstances, to change the
majority. There is a major danger because terrorism is a method of war particularly adapted to
the democracies. The target is the panic of the democracies, to immobilize them and lead them
not to intervene, from where all the blocked mechanism of military projections, because one did
not envisage the against-projection of dictatorial terrorism, or to lead them to go, of a way or
another. It is a true problem which is precisely not dealt with enough, in my opinion even at
all, by the considerations given today on the reasons for change of our army. There is an
insinuation which consists in thinking that at the bottom terrorism it is the business of the
police force and the professors of morals, and not of the army. After all, a General head of
staff would say: "it is not my business" terrorism, see Khaled Kelkal, was solved by Bruguières
judge, the Criminal Investigation Department, the RG, etc. And behaviour of Parisian in the
subway, the fact that they assume the danger, that they do not panic, that when there is a bag
they are careful, but nevertheless take the subway, this behaviour is due to the culture, the
education given in the colleges. The army will say: "it is not my business". That is discussed.
Up to that point, we were been useful by favorable chances. Certain attacks did not succeed,
for technical reasons. We are obliged to calculate on the future. Perhaps the army neglects
its own merit. Perhaps that if the French react rather well in the event of attack - I think of
Tati, but also with the others and if there is no general panic, if they are Masters of their
emotions, it is because they had also a military education, because a good part of youth learned
how to handle the danger, weapons, with living whole vis-a-vis dangers, even imaginary, with the
army. Can one say that the control of our emotions opposite terrorist dangers and war is due
only to the lessons of morals which would be distributed in the universities or the schools,
and to the completely effective work of the police force? Or is there a responsibility for the
army, military service? I think that the point of view should be widened, and to think that
anthropologiquement, in all the companies, the problem is posed education with violence and
violence, to learn how to die and to learn how to kill. It is a difficulty which arises in all
the companies. In those without writing, there is the box of the warriors in margin of the
normal habitat, of the village, with the edge of the zones of forest, hunting and desert,
the box of the young warriors where they are educated, where they are educated by the tradition
to control their violence, and also to exert it. They learn how to kill and die.
In Indo-European civilization, there is the warlike function subordinated to the function of
sovereignty and side, but separated from the economic function. I return you to Dumézil on this
subject. In the Greek tradition there is the education of the young warrior. There are various
styles of education. During all the Middle Ages - George Duby noticed -, there was the
responsibility for the man who requests, that of the man who makes the war, and that of the man
who works. But the man who makes the war was educated to do it. In all the cases of figure,
that there are a special caste or a civic education as among Greeks, there are a true autonomous
problem of education with and education of violence in the population, and in particular in the
young people. This problem is not dealt with by institution which is called the school.
Napoleon had provided that the colleges were to be very militarized because it confused both.
But the French tradition distinguishes the element from enlightened education and that of
military education. The function of education to violence was exerted by the conscription,
by the obligatory military service. I ask you the question, I do not have an absolute answer.
Can one make his mourning quite simply of it? There are three solutions in the modern democratic States: 1) the French solution that the Germans preserve: obligatory military service like education with and of violence. If Napoleon lost in Waterloo, it is not because of the
Marie-Louise. Let us read again Victor Hugo for the knowledge, the Marie-Louise fought and the French defended themselves rather well in front of the invasions of 1815. In any event, there is the obligatory solution military service to be educated with the violence, it is that which
retains the Germans. 2) the American solution is free education. There is an education with
violence in the United States, it is practised in the shooting ranges, in the private clubs,
associations of carriers of weapons, with extremely significant lobbies. It is the second
solution: the free market of education to violence. 3) Pas of education of the whole is, in my
opinion, the English solution. It functions in England, with certain restrictions, quite simply
because it is a country confronted with completely traditional dangers, with of course Irish terrorism. It raises technical questions, but not morals, it does not panic intellectually, symbolically the public, it is accustomed to the problem of Irish terrorism since three centuries. The English are not yet with the catches with a terrorism plus symbolic system and unforeseeable as that to which we face. England is an island, it is an enough hierarchical company where finally in the colleges sélect, young people learn also certain violent one reports/ratios, would be this only by the hazings. On the other hand, there are effects second, the battles of districts and hooligans appeared in England, in Bristol, Brighton... the culture even of violence and its sublimation. There is a spontaneous solution, the culture rock'n'roll. It is a form of sublimation of a violence of street and morals. The English solution appears to me extremely little adapted to our situation, we are not an island. The American solution? I believe that we go there, if we adopt the end of the military service purely and simply.
It appears extremely risky to me nevertheless, would be this only because of what currently
occurs to the United States. The other solution cannot be simply conservatory. The army does
not play exactly any more this role of education with and of violence, would be this only because
25 % of the young people do not go there. Wouldn't it be despite everything a mission of
national defense against the dangers of the 21st century, of the terrorism, which to educate and
learn how to live while learning how to die and kill? The fact of handling violent weapons,
of going together, of not panicking, of acting in concert, of trying to react in a way controlled
opposite the dangers, that cannot to new order being taught in the colleges, colleges and
universities. One hour ago of civics, it is all. Thus this problem is not solved.
However any company since the Neolithic era met, because in each one there are young people who have to control their own report/ratio with violence, and who, if not, are ready with all the
adventures. All the companies thought that they had to face a fundamental violence which could very easily leave the terminals and hinges. There are two absolutely general prohibitions in the
infinite diversity of the companies, that of the inceste, and that of a total violence.
The first is done by rules of marriage, etc, and the second by the education of the young
teenagers, of the young warriors.

Mr. of VILLEPIN, chair. - Thank you very much. We are very grateful to you of your talk.
Your reflexion was absolutely essential for the senators. I retained an essential sentence.
In all this problem of the military reform, we have, us, as members of Parliament, to decide with a vision with thirty or forty years. It is there all the object of our difficulty. Thanks for
having made us reflect.